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Abstract: 
In this paper, we suggest an alternative interpretation for the quantum state vector, which, by 
considering temporal parts for physical objects, aims to give an intelligible account of 
measurement problem in quantum mechanics. We examine the capacity of this interpretation 
as for explaining three measurement problems: the problem of outcome, the problem of 
statistics and the problem of effect. We argue that, this interpretation of the state vector, while 
providing a satisfactory account, as rationally plausible as its rivals, for the measurement 
problem, shows yet another limitation of our perceptual experience, i.e. our inability to 
perceive unsharp reality. 
Keywords: Measurement problem, interpretation of quantum mechanics, four-
dimensionalism, unsharp reality. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The so called measurement problem, from the inception of Quantum Mechanics (QM), has 
been one of the most controversial problems, and there is no general agreement, among both 
physicists and philosophers of physics, even on the problem itself. Despite the fact that some 
authors, like Bub (1974:140), have taken the measurement problem as a “psudo-problem” 
arising from “a misunderstanding of von Neumann’s problem”, others have suggested various 
models and interpretations, each of which is based on a specific construal of the problem with 
a different focus, to solve it. According to Albert's formulation of the problem, for instance, 
“The dynamics and the postulate of collapse are flatly in contradiction with one another (just 
as we had feared they might be); and the postulate of collapse seems to be right about what 
happens when we make measurements, and the dynamics seems to be bizarrely wrong about 
what happens when we make measurements; and yet the dynamics seems to be right about 
what happens whenever we aren't making measurements.” (1992:79). To be more precise, as 
Maudlin (1995) explained in his paper, entitled “Three Measurement Problems”, the 
following three claims about QM are mutually inconsistent:  
A) The wave-function of a system is complete. 
B) The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation. 
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C) Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) have determinate 
outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring device is either in a state which 
indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down (and not up). 
To see the inconsistency of these three claims, consider, For example, a good z-spin 
measuring device, which has a ready state (|ready〉)	and two indicator states (call them "UP" 
and "DOWN. The device is so constructed that if it is in its ready state and a z-spin up 
electron |+〉 is fed in, it will evolve, with certainty, into the "UP" state |""〉, and if a z-
spin down electron |−〉 is fed in, it will evolve, with certainty, into the "DOWN" state 
|""〉. Using obvious notation: 
|+〉|〉 → |+〉|""〉, and 
|−〉|〉 → |−〉|""〉 
If we feed in this device an electron in an eigenstate of x-spin rather than z-spin, since 
|+〉 → 1/√2|+〉 + 1/√2|−〉 
then according to the claim B and linearity of the evolution, the initial state must evolve into 
(1/√2|+〉 + 1/√2|−〉)|〉. 
But the question is what kind of state of the measuring device this represents: 
|!〉 = 1/√2(|+〉|""〉 + 	|−〉|""〉) 
If A is correct, and the wave-function is complete, then this wave-function must specify, 
directly or indirectly, every physical fact about the measuring device. But, simply by 
symmetry, it seems that this wavefunction cannot possibly describe a measuring device in the 
"UP" but not "DOWN" state or in the "DOWN" but not "UP" state. Since "UP" and 
"'DOWN" enter symmetrically into the final state, by what argument could one attempt to 
show that this device is, in fact, in exactly one of the two indicator states? 
So if A and B are correct, C must be wrong. If A and B are correct, z-spin measurements 
carried out on electrons in x-spin eigenstates will simply fail to have determinate outcomes. 
This seems to fly in the face of Born's rule, which says that such measurements should have a 
50% chance of coming out "UP" and a 50% chance of coming out "DOWN, simply because 
occurrence of outcomes is taken for granted within such a statistical framework. 
To resolve the contradiction, people have pursued different strategies. In some theories, 
like GRW, dynamics has been modified to a nonlinear one, and in some others, like Bohm’s 
model, it has been postulated more to physical reality than is represented in the wavefunction 
- namely, hidden variables. In yet another strategy, Everett-like theories, abandoning the very 
collapse postulate, have extended their ontology to many worlds, many minds, etc. In this 
paper, following the last strategy, by considering temporal parts for physical objects, taken as 
some sort of extension in ontology, we suggest an alternative interpretation for the quantum 
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state vector. This interpretation, according to Maudlin’s analysis, must overcome the “Three 
Measurement Problems”: 
The problem of outcomes. In QM, we encounter with some weird superposition states, 
which are linear combination of some pure states. The problem associated with these 
superposition states, which are themselves pure and independent, is that, after measurement 
process, the system randomly chooses one of the states in the superposition and eventually 
ends up with a determinate possible value for the associated observable quantity. In fact, “It 
is just the usual understanding of the Schrodinger cat problem laid out in a formally exact 
way. Oddly enough, when so laid out, it becomes immediately evident that a fair amount of 
the work in the foundations of quantum theory misses the mark. The most widespread 
misunderstanding arises from the claim that the measurement problem has to do with 
superpositions versus mixed states.” (Maudlin 1995:9) 
The problem of statistics. QM suggests probabilistic results satisfying Born's rule. 
Measurement situations, started with the same initial wave functions, could lead to different 
outcomes. The Probability of obtaining each outcome is in accord with Born's rule. The 
problem is present when wave functions evolve according to the linear dynamics. Why 
similar wave functions end up to different outcomes, in accords with Born's rule? 
The problem of effects. This problem emerges from the fact that, according to standard 
interpretation, in measurement processes, collapse changes the state of the system, and so 
influences its future development. The state of the quantum mechanical system after 
measurement should be an eigenstate corresponding to the measurement outcome. The main 
motive for considering such a condition is that measurement is repeatable. To attain 
repeatability, the system after measurement should be in an eigenstate corresponding to the 
relevant observable, so that the second measurement, which is done immediately1 after the 
first, yields with probability 1 the previous result. 
Every proposal for tackling the measurement problem should have enough resources to 
give a satisfactory account of these three problems. Facing these difficulties, many physicists 
and philosophers have called for some new satisfactory conceptual schemes and categories. 
Moving in this direction, we are about to suggest a new interpretation for the quantum vector 
state, while giving a satisfactory account for the measurement problem, we believe, is as 
rationally plausible as its rivals. To begin with, we first illustrate a new picture of 
observation and measurement, which our interpretation is based on. 
2. Observation and Measurement in the New Picture 
According to a view about physical objects, which is called three-dimensionalism (3D), 
objects persist through time by “enduring,”2 that is, by being wholly present at all times at 
                                                        
1
 As for ‘immediately’ condition, it is only important that, at the time of the second measurement, Schrödinger 
evolution does not change state of the system. 
 
2
 ‘enduring’,‘perduring’, and ‘stage’ are borrowed from temporal parts and four-dimensionalism debate 
terminology and literature. See for example Hawley (2010) in SEP. 
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which they exist. In this account, the system cannot be in two states A and B at the same 
time; observing it always ends up having a determinate value for the relevant quantity. Based 
on such a picture and presupposition, if there is a theory for description of the physical 
reality, attributing superposition of states A and B to a system, then we would be in trouble to 
interpret how the system could be in such a weird state. So we might consider this 
description of physical reality incomplete, (i.e., there should be some other parameters and 
variables to specify whether system is in state A or B, or the theory is simply false. 
There is, however, yet another way out of this dilemma, by suggesting an alternative 
picture for evolution and observation of system, while, it is claimed, is consistent with 
superposition states. To do this, we emphasize that, QM needs to introduce new conceptual 
scheme to overcome its difficulties. By appealing to some advantages of the new 
interpretation of the vector state,  we will show that solving the measurement problem in QM 
requires a four-dimensional ontology of objects, according to which, objects persist four-
dimensionally through time with temporal parts that is, by being temporally, as well as 
spatially, extended.1 
Based on this interpretation, the physical object coincides with time and, like time, it is a 
continuum2, which has flowing3 temporal parts: the outcome of measuring an observable of 
the system, at this moment, is always something other than the outcome we would obtain in 
another measurement event at some other time, past or future. At each time slice, what is 
observed is a new stage (or a temporal part) of a flowing unsharp observable (or a four-
dimensional object) at every moment of time. In other words, as time passes, the old stage of 
the preceding observable is annihilated and the new stage of it comes to exist in its place, and 
this renewal happens continuously at every moment. ‘Countinous’, here, implies that the 
mixture is an improper, as opposed to be a proper mixture, of instant sharp observables in an 
interval of time. The unsharp observable is continuous and unified like a continuous 
spectrum, and so, actually, it is a unified continuous reality. So objects are thought to have 
instantaneous temporal parts (‘time-slices’), which do not themselves persist through time. 
This mode of reality, in its totality, cannot be wholly exist simultaneously and cannot be 
wholly found at every moment of time, but its totality exists in its whole lifetime. For an 
intuitive picture, consider the following scenario. 
Imagine an observer who is an inhabitant of a flatland, a two-dimensional world 
populated by beings having only two spatial dimensions and wholly confined to a surface. 
For simplicity, let this surface be a plane. Now, suppose that he/she is presented with an 
                                                        
1
 The original idea of this paper was under the influence of the ontology of Sadra's philosophy (1571–1641), 
especially, Obudyyat's (2006/1385). This idea was completed by recent attempts in four-dimensionalism 
ontology and its applications in physics. In this regard, especially, Balashov (1999) was provocative. 
2
 The main feature of a continuum is that it is hypothetically divisible. That is, for every moment of time, there is 
always an instant, after that moment, which can be, in relation to that moment, considered as future, and an 
instant, before it, which can be, in relation to that moment, considered as past. 
3
 A continuum could be persistent or flowing. Persistent continuum, like line, area and volume, is a continuum 
whose parts exist altogether. However, none of the two hypothetical parts of a flowing continuum, like time, 
exist together.   
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object, for example a pyramid. As it is shown in the following picture, the flatlander 
perceives reality only in two-dimensional plane, and has not any perception of the third 
dimension; in other words, his situation made him incapable of perceiving the third 
dimension. He is ignorant of what there is, in the other dimension, external to his plane. 
 
Now imagine a purely and uniformly colored in black pyramid with a triangle base; this 
pyramid is in a pure state. Before the pyramid enters to the plane, there is nothing for the 
flatlander. But when it enters into the observer's world, and when the plane intersects with the 
pyramid, the observer sees only a cross section of the pyramid, i.e. a black triangle. This 
triangle persists to exist for the flatlander by enduring through time interval in which, the 
pyramid passes the plane. As a matter of fact, flatlanders perceive two-dimensional slices. 
Now imagine another observer who perceives the third dimension. He would realize how 
the observer in the plane could see the pyramid: the flatlander falsely thinks and reports, at a 
moment of time that a triangle comes to exist, and after passing some time, it is annihilated. 
But the situation for the second observer is radically different as no triangle being observed. 
Therefore, from the second observer's point of view, what the flatlander perceives, is in fact a 
‘hypothetical’ cross section of the pyramid with the plane. Moreover, the flatlander, because 
of the pure black color of the pyramid, has the illusion that there is only one and the same 
triangle, which would come to exist, persists in the time interval, and it has never undergone 
a change or evolution. This is an illusion, however, from the second observer's point of view, 
which is outside the plane. He knows that the flatlander has never seen the same triangle in 
any two moments, but because these triangles are in complete similarity with each other, it 
appears to him as only one persistent triangle. He has observed different triangles, which are 
temporal parts of a 3D object, i.e. the pyramid, at different instants of time. 
The two observers both give a true description for their observations but, by considering 
the additional dimension, the description of the second observer is more complete. One might 
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ask whether the flatlander could reach to the second observer's picture at all. Certainly, he 
could, but not by direct observation. He could reach that picture by imagination, theorizing or 
mathematical abstraction. 
Therefore, according to our accounts, picture of objects, if we accept that objects and 
physical systems have temporal parts, it follows that the sentient observer always perceives 
only a part or a stage of the unsharp observable of a flowing system, since mental experience 
occurs momentarily. As it was said before, the flatlander never sees the three-dimensional 
pyramid, and only sees a cross-section of it. In the same vein, observers in a measurement 
process never see the whole of the flowing system, which coincides with time. Rather, in 
every measurement and observation, the observer sees only the hypothetical cross-section or 
a stage of it, which is in its plane. In our example, though it appears to the observer that he 
sees the same triangle, but, in fact he sees a new triangle at every moment of time. Similarly, 
our observer in the measurement process has the same feeling as regards the observing 
system. That is, it appears to him that he always sees the same system, while the system is 
always becoming new. He is not able to feel the evolution of the new system, by the same 
reason that applies to the flatlander. Those triangles that the flatlander sees, are not discrete 
from each other, rather they are all ‘hypothetical’ cross-sections of a continuous persistent 
system. The determinate values observed by the observer are not ‘discrete’ and ‘isolated’ 
from each other. It is also not the case that the observer measures the observable independent 
of what he has observed or what he will observe. All of them are hypothetical continuous 
cross sections (or temporal parts or temporal stages) of what is called a flowing system.  
In the flowing picture, therefore, the system, with all of its unsharp properties, evolves 
altogether, but the observer thinks that the system (or other properties of the system), is at rest 
and does not evolve. It appears to him that, in every moment, the system exists with all of its 
sharp properties and sharp observables. After that moment they are all annihilated and the 
system with all of its observables are simultaneously renewed again, and so on. This happens, 
however, in a way that these becoming sharp realities, in sum, create a flowing object, 
without any discontinuity between becoming sharp realities. Based on this picture of reality, 
we give an interpretation for the quantum vector state. 
3. Interpretation of the Quantum Vector State 
Unless we change our interpretation, it would be meaningless to say an electron, which is in a 
superposition state, is in several positions. Many interpretations have been suggested for such 
weird states, and for explaining how it could be reconciled with our definite experiences. In 
the many worlds interpretation, for example, there are several copies of electron in different 
positions in different worlds. This is, however, not the only way out. The Sigma 
interpretation1, based on the picture of observation and evolution presented in previous 
section, is another way of attempting to do, like the many worlds, without the collapse. 
                                                        
1
 ‘Sigma’, or ∑, denotes  summation or superposition, which the Sigma interpretation (SI) takes it as real and 
genuine. It is also the first letter of Sadra the philosopher (1571–1641).  
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Sigma makes two physical claims: I) The state vector of a system completely describes the 
physical reality of that system. II) The state vector evolves in accordance with Schrodinger's 
equation. The problem, as we have seen, is how to square II with the appearances and 
especially with the definiteness of our experience. According to this interpretation, if we 
understand the state of the system in a certain way, we will see that the collapse and the 
probability interpretation emerge as features of the theory. The state of the system |!〉 can be 
represented as a superposition thus: 
|!〉 = #$ |$ 〉 + #%|%〉 … 
where the & constitute a complete set of basis vectors that span the Hilbert space for the 
whole system. Our suggestion is that each of the components of the superposition be thought 
of as representing the density of the local state, in which, the temporal parts of the flowing 
system are created or renewed. 
How can the flowing object save the appearances? Suppose that an observer M measures the 
x-spin of an electron e in an eigenstate of z spin. Let +z be the state z-spin "up", +x (-x) be 
the state x-spin "up" ("down"), Bo be the state of the observer prior to making the 
measurement and +B (-B) be the state of M observing that x spin is up (down). Before the 
measurement the state of the System is	|Bo〉|+〉. At the conclusion of the measurement the 
state of the system (observer+electron) is 
1/√2(|+)〉|+〉 +	 |−)〉|−〉) 
According to the Sigma, the flowing electron has been renewing, has been creating, at every 
moment, in “spin-up” OR “Spin-down”.  So, when M measures the spin of the electron, she 
observes definitely “spin-up” OR “spin-down”. Each time she has a perfectly definite 
experience corresponding to the perfectly definite stage (temporal part) of the electron. 
So, we take wave function as a description of a flowing system. In the flowing picture, at 
every moment, only a cross-section or a stage of the physical system, not the whole physical 
system, could be found. Moreover, the observer finds every cross-section or stage only at a 
moment and it is not possible for an individual stage to be found at every moment1. 
According to this interpretation, the state vector could be considered as a description of a 
single isolated system. Whereas the wave function describes the system as a flowing object, 
probability finds a new meaning; obtaining a determinate outcome in a measurement process 
is related to the statistical distribution of potential stages and states of the flowing system, 
which are reflected in the superposition state. The system, therefore, is always in motion and 
evolution during its entire lifetime, and their becomings happen with a new value for the 
observable, but in its entire lifetime. The probability attributed to the renewals, however, is 
                                                        
1
 As in Everett's (1973:61) interpretation, this result is independent of the size of the object, and remains true for 
objects of quite macroscopic dimensions. That is, they are also flowing reality, which are followed by the 
fluidity of their parts. So, Sigma interpretation, as Everett's (1973:87-8), gives a unified description of micro- 
and marco-objects. 
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governed by a specific distribution, i.e. according Born's rule1, and, of course, at every 
moment of time, the distribution of temporal parts of the “quantum object”, described by the 
quantum state, evolves according to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation.  
von Neumann's interpretation of state is not realistic, and takes it merely as a theoretical 
construct. On the contrary, in the Sigma interpretation (SI) as in Everett's, state vector refers 
to a real state of affairs. From a realist stance regarding quantum states follows the reality of 
superposition states and their implicit indeterminacy. Indeed, according to the SI, the system 
is principally in a superposition state but, when according to the standard view, the system is 
in pure eigen-state, the terms in the superposition are the same; even when system is in a pure 
state, it should be interpreted that the system is in continuous renewals in ‘states’, which 
happen to be, in complete similarity. So if the state of the system is in the superposition of 
states corresponding to the black and white color we should not interpret it as “being black 
and white” probability, rather we should talk about probability of “becoming” black or white. 
That is, the system at every moment is becoming black and white. Of course, the system, in 
its renewal and becoming, has sharp observable quantities, but these quantities do not have 
distinguishable values. All systems and states, therefore, even when they appear to be at rest, 
are in continuous renewal and becoming.2 One may object that there is nothing to identify 
these renewal states as constituting the same individual's experience. In replying to this 
objection, it should be noted here, in passing, since, in the SI, the reality of superpositions 
preserves trans-temporal identity of systems, this perpetual renewal does not violates the 
identity of the physical system.  
4. Problem of Outcome 
If wave-function is considered complete, then it must specify every physical fact about 
the composite system and the measuring device. But by what argument could one attempt to 
show that the composite system, in a superposition state, gives actually in exactly one 
determinate outcome? That is the problem of outcome in the measurement problem. 
According to the mentioned account, and using Balashov's (1999) terminology, the 
relation between the spatial properties of the pyramid and of the triangles perceived by 
flatlanders is a rather intimate, ancestral relation. The 2D shapes are directly “inherited” 
from the 3D shapes, as being constituted by one-dimensional sides fully belonging to two-
dimensional edges of the original three-dimensional object. It is an objective feature of the 
way in which Flatland as a whole is situated in the wider three-dimensional “superspace.” 
The main discovery of the Flatland physicists is the discovery of this objective, ontological 
feature to which they have been led to by an argument to the best explanation. A hypothesis 
                                                        
1
 So, based on this interpretation, it is not compelling to take probability or chance as an inherent feature of the 
world. As in Ballentine's statistical approach, perusing hidden variables is legitimate. Above all, it is still 
necessary to provide an explanation for the specific distribution governs renewals.     
2
 This is very similar to Bohm's ‘holomovement’ concept. The idea that everything is in a state of flow or 
becoming (or what he calls the "universal flux"). For Bohm, wholeness is not a static oneness, but a dynamic 
wholeness-in-motion, in which everything moves together in an interconnected process. See (Bohm & Hiley 
1993:355), (Pylkkanen 2007:25), and Bohm (1980:11) 
9 
 
could be put forward, by the physicist of the Flatland, that the triangle is a cross-section of a 
three-dimensional being and it ought to be a pyramid situated with respect to Flatland as 
shown in the above Figure.1 
In the relative-state interpretation, all possible measurement outcomes are considered 
equally real for a fictitious, non-existent(or global) “observer” outside the Universe who 
views the universal state vector, whereas for each observers inside the Universe it is always 
one particular value of the measured observable that is real. In the same vein, in the SI of the 
measurement process, the relation between unsharp observables and determinate outcomes, 
perceived by the observer, is a rather intimate, ancestral relation. The determinate outcomes, 
which the observer perceives, are slices of a flowing unsharp reality, which from an 
atemporal observer's standpoint, indistinguishably sit beside each other. The usual observer, 
because of his limited perceptual ability (that is because he cannot have a perceptual 
experience of the whole system at a moment), can only see a determinate outcome. In other 
words, as any observer's experience happens at a moment of the continuum of time, and as 
the observer observes the system from a lower dimension and intersects with the flowing 
reality, only at a moment or at a point of flowing continuum, he inevitably sees a determinate 
outcome. After all, we cannot observe total lifetime of an entity or even a part of it at a 
moment.2 Accordingly, as in many-worlds interpretation, in which determinate outcomes in 
every world explain empirical content of the theory, in the same manner, in the SI, temporal 
parts of the fluid object, which are indistinguishably determined at every moment, account 
for the empirical content. 
In hidden variable theories take it for granted that experience gives us a ‘complete’ 
description of reality; since we experience determinate outcomes, we conclude that reality is 
completely determined. On the other hand, since, in quantum mechanics, we encounter 
superposition states, which imply an indeterminism, so we eventually have to hold quantum 
mechanics as incomplete theory. After all, it could not have yielded a representation for 
determined reality (the reality we reached, based on our sense experience). Accordingly, 
there needs to be additional parameters to make it complete. According to the SI, however, 
contra what a hidden variable theorist believes, our experience does not give us a ‘complete’ 
description of reality and the determinate experience comes from our inability to experience 
indeterminate superposition or unsharp reality. In fact, we encounter a situation which can be 
described by Duhem-Quine thesis. The SI prefers to take the appearance of ‘determinate 
outcomes’ as a product of our mind.3 Although we are unable to have a perceptual experience 
                                                        
1
 Here, we have almost used Balashov's exposition of the scenario (1999). 
2
 Contra Everett's theory in which all elements of superposition states represent actual realities which 
simultaneously exist, in Sigma interpretation, elements of superposition state represent potential realities which 
briefly and indistinguishably exist in a flowing continuum represented by the superposition state in its totality. 
This is followed by the fact that in Everett's theory, superposition state represents a persistent system, which 
exists through time by enduring, while Sigma theory interprets superposition state as a flowing continuum.  
3
 According to von Neumann, as far as formalism of QM concerns, there is no physical collapse, and we 
encounter with superposition states. To obtain determinate outcomes, he believes in a mental collapse. On the 
other hand, for any determination in mental level, it seems that there should be a correspondent determination in 
physical level. Handling this problem, von Neumann suggests an arbitrary distinction between observed system 
and observer (von Neumann 1955:421), Becker (2004). Although this “arbitrariness” does not explain why and 
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of superposition state1, we could reach to those indeterminate superpositions by theorizing or 
mathematical abstraction, as we reach the heliocentric picture of solar system by theorizing, 
rather direct observation or sense experience.  
By these considerations, we hold a realist position about superposition states by taking 
superposition states describing a mode of existence of a reality and its temporal parts. These 
temporal parts have a brief and potential reality in superpositions, not in the sense that those 
states do not exist outside of the superposition, and they are not real.2 They are real but not in 
an independent and distinguishable way. So in the SI, superposition states of dead and alive 
cat represents unsharp reality of dead cat state and alive cat state. The superposition state of 
cat describes Schrodinger's cat from an atemporal point of view and describes it as a flowing 
system with an unsharp reality. So, the state of cat is potentially both dead and alive. Not in 
the sense that cat is not alive (dead) now, and at this moment, and can be alive (dead). But in 
the sense that the cat's flowing reality, can be found alive (dead) by cutting the flowing reality 
of cat, i.e. by measuring it and by participation of mind and consciousness in the process.3,4 It 
should be noted that, in the Sigma model, obtaining a determinate outcome is the result of the 
special metaphysical relation of the observer as regards to the system, nay the special role of 
the measurement. That makes the state of the observer to depend upon the system. It depends 
on which plane it cuts the flowing system. This relativity is not also a newborn feature. 
Copenhagen and Everett's interpretation have this feature too.5 In the Sigma model, however, 
there is an explanation for it. The dependency of sub-systems to other parts of the composite 
                                                                                                                                                                            
how the collapse occurs, the SI claims to explain it by suggesting a new ontology and conceptual scheme. It 
should be noted that the ‘product of our mind’ does not mean that the determinate outcomes are not real. They 
are briefly and indistinguishably exist in a flowing continuum (see footnote 2, p. 9). 
1
 The relation between mental states and physical states is not supervenience. The same is true for Bohm's, von 
Neumann's and Everett's model, either. 
2
 Heisenberg (1958:53), used the idea of Aristotelian ‘potentia’ in his later work on the foundations of the 
quantum theory.  He goes beyond the usual interpretation of the pure quantum state as the catalogue of all actual 
properties—those with probability equal to one—of an individual system in that he considers ψ as the catalogue 
of the potentialities of all possible (sharp) properties Q of the system, quantified by the probabilities pψ(Q) = 
<|ψ|Qψ>. The notion of actualization of potentialities, then, makes it possible for one to “say that the transition 
from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction between the object and the measuring 
device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration 
of the result in the mind of the observer.” (1958: 54-55). Potentiality has been also articulated by Shimony 
(1993:179) as a modality of existence of physical systems. But Heisenberg and Shimony's conception of 
“potentiality” is not in temporal parts context. 
3
 So, Copenhagen interpretation is right, in a sense, when it says that we have a determinate outcome just after 
measurement, but the importance lies in explaining it. the meaning of this claim is criticizable and rational only 
in a metaphysical framework, not by denying metaphysics and ontological theorizing. 
4
 In another project the concept of unsharp quantum reality, though ontologically different from ours, has been 
also suggested, and a particular way of formalizing it was explored by Busch et. al, (1996) to explain quantum 
indeterminacy and measurement problem. However since, in this approach, there is no room for the role of 
mind, it requires a stochastic modification of the unitary time evolution postulate for quantum dynamics. See 
Busch & Jaeger (2011). 
5
 Bohr criticized EPR's ‘physical reality criterion’.  According to Bohr, this criterion is essentially ambiguous 
because it is proposed without considering experimental arrangement (Bohr 1935:697). According to the 
fundamental relativity of quantum mechanical states, in Everett's relative state interpretation, likewise, we speak 
of observer's state relative to the system's state. 
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system, moreover, explains both indeterminism and continuum-ness, and it means that the 
whole has an ontological priority to its parts.1 
4.1. Sharp Reality and Unsharp Reality 
As mentioned above, in the SI, physical system has two modes of reality, one mode is 
unsharp and the other is determinate or sharp. What we measure as a sentient observer is its 
determinate feature, which appears to the mind as a sharp reality, and what acts in nature 
without the contribution of mind is the unsharp reality. For example, +1/2 and -1/2 in z 
direction at every moment are sharp reality of spin of electron. In this sense, spin exist in 
sharp or determinate mode of reality. On the contrary, different states in the superposition 
correspond to different values but in a potential and indistinguishable way. So, spin has 
another kind of reality which is unsharp. It has both +1/2 and -1/2 values, but in a brief an 
indistinguishable and of course flowing way. 
So, according to the SI, superposition state of a flowing object refers to a genuine, 
simple and unified reality. We should not think of it as representing the sum of or real mixture 
of multitudes of individual realities attached together. This explains why, in QM, we ought to 
differentiate between superposition states and mixed states, to distinguish between proper 
mixture and improper mixture2. Although, the superposition is a reality, which is genuine and 
simple, it does potentially, indistinguishably, and briefly include parts other than what has 
been determinately observed by the observer. It follows that the reality of the superposition 
does not imply a mere multiplicity and plurality to end up with the difficulty of how an object 
could be simultaneously in multiple exclusive states. 
Moreover, superposition state is a more complete description of reality than what is 
given by our observation and measurements as a determinate outcome, and as what appears 
to us as mental reality. Superposition states description of physical reality is a description of 
higher order or by considering a higher dimension as regards the determinate observed 
outcomes. This matter, accordingly, leads us to the conclusion that the reality of 
superposition state and indistinguishable reality should be considered as the origin of 
determination and definiteness of outcomes of measured quantities, not as denying it. If we 
were to consider the unsharp reality from the lower dimension, then it would appear to us as a 
determinate outcome; it would appear as specific, definite, or distinguishable.3 but if we were 
to consider it from higher dimension, the ‘superposition’, would be superposition! 
                                                        
1
 This wholeness in Bohm's model, that is the fact that “ …  not only the inter-relationships of the parts, but also 
their very existence is seen to flow out of the law of the whole.” (1971:viii), is explained by dependency of 
quantum potential on the state of the whole system. 
2
 Disregarding this distinction leads to some confusions, when considering decoherence model as a solution for 
measurement problem. Bell (1990:25) raised this objection in this way: “The idea that elimination of coherence, 
in some way or other, implies the replacement of 'and' by 'or', is a very common one among solvers of the 
'measurement problem'. It has always puzzled me.”; see also: Maudlin (1995:10). 
3
 Attempts to suggest new interpretations show that we have to extend our ontology and provide new conceptual 
schemes to understand the measurement process in QM. In Everett-like interpretations, this extension appears as 
additional worlds or minds, and in Bohm's model it appears as additional variables and a new potential with 
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Since superposition states are considered for certain observable and quantity, they are 
written in certain basis of space1. These are superposition of pure states, each of which 
corresponds to specific values of the relevant observable. As for the pyramid and triangle 
picture, there is an ancestral relation between pure states and the superposition, which they 
make. This relation, since it has an ontological meaning in SI, explains how we encounter the 
two modes of realization of the same physical quantity; and they are represented in the same 
space.  
Denying the reality of the superposition states originates from the presupposition that 
systems could only be determinately and definitely realized. But there is no compelling 
reason for this presupposition. We could consider systems as four-dimensional objects, 
though indeterminate from the four dimensional point of view, which is appeared 
determinate in three dimensional standpoint. This does not mean that unsharp reality, in its 
totality, exists at every moment of its lifespan. Since the total continuum of the unsharp 
observable, corresponding to the superposition state, does not realized at every moment (it is 
a flowing reality), it is not possible at all, for the observer, to see the whole continuum of 
unsharp observable at a “moment”, but he sees its total continuum in its total lifetime.2 The 
determinate value we see for an observable quantity, at every moment, is only a hypothetical 
cross-section of the flowing continuum of the unsharp observable corresponding to the 
superposition state. In other words, the observer is right in describing and reporting his 
experience, but he is wrong in interpreting his determinate experience as the ultimate and 
complete reality.3 From the atemporal observer's point of view, or based on the quantum 
description of reality, system is not in a determinate state but it is in a superposition of states.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
some weird properties. In Bohm's model, which denies superposition states, quantum potential is responsible for 
all of those strange behaviors which result from superposition states (Riggs 2009:127). 
1
 Furthermore, while Dirac developed the general principles of quantum theory, he gave no preferred role to 
picturing processes explicitly as occurring in space, the democratic equality between different points of view 
was maintained in the new dynamics that resulted. All observables, and their corresponding eigenstates, had 
equal status as far as fundamental theory was concerned. The physicists express this conviction by saying 
that there is no ‘preferred basis’ (a special set of states, corresponding to a special set of observables, that are 
of unique significance). Wrestling with the measurement problem raised in the minds of some the problem of 
preferred basis. But, in the SI, this is by no means a fundamental necessity. Because of the continuous total 
renewal of the object, at every moment of time, and since our object, renewed with all of its properties, 
consistent with Dirac's formulation, there is no need to an objective preferred basis. The so-called preferred 
basis is as a result of what we (as observer) prefer to choose for measurement. 
 
2
 While there is no plausible account for unobservability of Everett's branches (or other worlds in many-worlds 
interpretation) (Barrett 1999:158-9), there is an explanation for unobservability of all states or outcomes at a 
moment: all physical systems and entities are in correspondent with continuum of time, and because of the 
flowing nature of them, as in the stage theory, they persist through time by perduring, not enduring. I used the 
term ‘perdure’ to hold the basic idea that persistence is much like spatial extension. These systems, therefore, 
are four-dimensional objects with temporal parts, but we experience only a brief temporal parts or 'stages' of 
those four-dimensional objects. 
3
 Comparing with the bare theory makes this more clear. According to the bare theory, when a system is in 
superposition state, the observer would falsely report that he got some determinate result, because, as a matter of 
fact, there is no determinate state (Barrett 1999:96). But according to the Sigma interpretation, the observer has 
really a determinate experience, he mistakes when he thinks what he observes at every moment is the whole of 
the system. 
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4.2. A Critique Against the existence of Superposition 
One might raise the objection that since the pointer of measuring device is quite a classical 
object, and different values obtained in measurement are macroscopically distinguishable, it 
makes no sense to say that it has no definite position at any instant of time.1 This sort of 
objection considers a relation between distinguishable values of a quantity and its reality. In 
the SI, however, it should be emphasized again, there is no distinguishable position for the 
system before the measurement, and one cannot deduce nonexistence from 
indistinguishability. 
To be more intuitive, consider the real numbers axis, which consists of numbers, 
innumerably and indistinguishably, ordered along the axis. This does not mean they do not 
exist. They exist, but not in a distinguishable way. Here we emphasis again that the meaning 
of potentiality of states in a superposition state is not that system, at the present, has no 
specific, and definite state, and could have it, rather it means the system indistinguishably 
takes the values corresponding to those states, just as real numbers axis, which is real and 
genuine, innumerably and indistinguishably includes numbers. When it is said that numbers 
indistinguishably and innumerably exist, it does not mean that the axis is devoid of any 
numbers. It innumerably consists of all numbers. It is possible to distinguish and specify a 
definite number in the real numbers axis only through cutting the real numbers continuum. In 
the same vein, only by cutting the superposition state, i.e. by doing measurement on the 
system, which is in superposition state, we could reach to a determinate and distinguishable 
state. Consequently, a determinate outcome corresponding to the pure state for the relevant 
observable could be obtained. 
On might object that individuality is based on definiteness and distinguishability from 
others. When we accept that a system is in a superposition state and is not distinguishably in 
any parts of the superposition, and when we accept that its definiteness and determination can 
only be reached through cutting the superposition in hypothetical moments or points of time, 
it follows that those parts of superposition are ‘hypothetical’ and ‘unreal’. That is, system 
lacks any values for the quantity. In other words, it seems, since before measurement, the 
system is in a superposition state, it lacks any definite value for that quantity, which, in turn, 
corroborates Heisenberg's assertion: there is no observable before a measurement2. This is the 
same conclusion which Einstein, rightly but based on a certain metaphysical framework, 
refused to accept by asking the question: do you mean when you do not look at the moon it 
does not exist?! 
A system in superposition state, before a measurement, actually has values for the 
relevant observables but it should be noted that these “actual” values or individuals are for 
the flowing and persisting observable quantity stretches out four-dimensionally through 
                                                        
1
 See Ballentine (1970:368-9) for this objection. 
2
 Heisenberg’s famous dictum in his (1927) Uncertainty Principle Paper was that “I believe that the existence of 
the classical "path" can be pregnantly formulated as follows: The "path" comes into existence only when we 
observe it.” 
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time. The above objection had some force if the assumption to the effect that there is no 
observable before measurement would be plausible. But in the light of our account and by 
taking quantities of system as flowing properties, then the system undoubtedly consists of 
values for the observables. 
5. Problems of Statistics 
Quantum Mechanical predictions are probabilistic, based on the Born's rule. The usual 
application of Born's rule says that the outcome of an experiment is not determined, and there 
is, in fact, a certain chance of getti ng a possible outcome. One might ask, how is it possible 
that the complete wave function always evolves in accord with a deterministic dynamical 
equation (i.e.. the Schrodinger equation), but in measurement situations which are described 
by identical initial wave functions, measurement sometimes yields different outcomes, and 
the probability of each possible outcome is given (at least approximately) by Born's rule?  
To account for the problem of statistics, consider the case of pyramid, plane and 
flatlander again. Suppose further that the pyramid has been colored in black and white. These 
colors are exclusively and randomly distributed in the pyramids so that cutting every cross-
section of it, gives us a black or white cross-section. Though randomly distributed, we could 
see, in sum, half-length of pyramid is white and half in black. Therefore, if we cut a cross-
section of it, there is a half chance of getting white and half chance of getting black. 
What does the flatlander observe in the plane? Since he does not know of the third 
dimension, he observes a triangle, which randomly becomes black and white. But if this 
pyramid passes through the plane, times and again, he could eventually reach to the 
conclusion that, in sum or a in long run, the triangle, half of its lifetime becomes white and 
half of its lifetime becomes black.  
On the other hand, for the external observer, there is no real triangle. But there are 
triangles which are cross-sections of a pyramid colored in black and white with a specific 
distribution. It appears to the flatlander that there is a triangle becoming white and black. 
Moreover, for the external observer, the pyramid, in its totality, is neither black nor white, 
and only after cutting the pyramid we could say the cross section is white or black. So 
flatlander's mind randomly, but based on a specific distribution, experiences a specific and 
determinate color. The evolution of the flowing object wave function, or in Everett's words 
the evolution of global wave function, is causal and deterministic. But, since the observer's 
mind experiences the randomly becoming black and white stages of the flowing object, based 
on a specific distribution, so the evolution of flatlander's mental state, is probabilistic and 
random. Accordingly, like Everett's model in the SI, although wave mechanics (Schrodinger 
equation) is deterministic, it gives rise to probabilistic appearances at the mental level, in such 
a way that the relative frequency of determinate outcomes is square of coefficients of 
superposition elements (Everett 1973:78), (Barrett 1999:79-81). But while there is no 
explanation, in Everett's theory, to account for why the observer has such mental experiences, 
in the SI there is an intelligible account for it. 
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The SI accepts the commonsense and intuitive idea that no individual system actually 
could be in different states at a moment, but it is possible to be in different states at different 
moments. Wave functions, in this interpretation, describe a flowing system that evolves 
according to Schrödinger equation. The system has a mode of existence or is in a state of 
affairs, known as the superposition, which originates from the fact that the system does not 
persist by enduring through time, i.e. it is not wholly present at every moments of time at 
which it exists.  
These renewals, as in the statistical interpretation, are governed by Born's rule. We use 
the ensemble concept to define the probabilities because attributing the probability to every 
new state of happenings has conceptual difficulties. The technical reason is the same as in 
statistical mechanics; As Albert (2000:63) put it: 
 “it has to do with the fact that the sort of information we can actually have about physical 
systems—the sort that we can get (that is) by measuring—is invariably compatible with a 
continuous infinity of the system’s microconditions. This follows from the fact that the totality 
of the possible microconditions of any Newtonian system invariably has the cardinality of the 
continuum, and that the accuracies of the measurements that we are able to perform are 
invariably infinite. But the only way of assigning equal probability to all of those conditions at 
the time in question will be by assigning each and every one of them the probability zero. And 
that will of course tell us nothing whatsoever about how to make our predictions.”1 
The dispersion of measuring device pointer, in the SI, expresses possible measurement 
outcomes, and as far as the observation is concerned, there is no difference between the 
Sigma and the statistical interpretation in this regard. Experimentally, it makes no difference 
whether to say, we have a flowing system which has continual renewals with a specific 
distribution, or to say we have different systems, which are similarly prepared, and when we 
measure them, we would find a specific distribution for positions. The difference lies at the 
ontological level. 
The statistical interpretation of the state vector could not be considered as a description 
of individual system. Ballentine rightly maintains that it makes no sense to say, that pointer 
of a macroscopic system has not a determinate position (Ballentine 1970:371). However, it 
makes no sense in a specific metaphysical framework, and it might be possible and 
meaningful in a different metaphysical framework.  
Contrary to the ontology of statistical interpretation, as we consider quantum systems as 
flowing and four-dimensional objects, SI takes dispersion as a property of the individual 
systems. These objects do not persist by enduring through time. That is, the system could not 
distinguishably have all of the possibilities, and could not distinguishably take all the possible 
positions at a moment, rather the quantum systems indistinguishably and potentially takes all 
those possibilities, the quantum objects persist four-dimensionally through time, and the 
observer's measurement mentally creates a distinguishable determinate position for him. 
                                                        
1
 Since these renewals are happening at every moment so they are superluminal but relativity governs on 
ensembles of them. Compare this with what Bohm said: at the underlying level there could be nonlocal behavior 
but at the ordinary level, we experience covariant behavior (Bohm & Hiley 1993:286).  
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Everett also makes a difference between mental state and physical state evolution. While 
he takes the latter as a deterministic process, he takes the first, i.e. mental state evolution, as a 
probabilistic process. In the SI, likewise, if distribution of renewal at t0 is |Ψ(t0)|2, then 
Schrodinger equation deterministically gives us the distribution |Ψ(t)|2. But system's renewals 
at every moment happen, at best, according to the statistical distribution and accordingly we 
could attribute a probability to the ensemble.1  
In the Sigma model the physical state of the flowing quantum object always evolves in 
the usual linear way, but in order to have a complete theory, we also need to specify an 
auxiliary dynamic. Perhaps the simplest dynamics would be one like the configuration 
dynamics in Bell's Everett theory, where the probability of observer's current mental state is 
fully determined by the current physical state alone and is always equal to the norm-squared 
of the component of the universal state that describes observer as currently believing the 
corresponding determinate outcome.2 The Sigma interpretation with the completely random 
stage dynamics, which were discussed above, would convert to something like Bell's Everett 
theory. The continuous and random renewal of temporal parts of the flowing system makes 
observer's mental state to jump randomly regardless of its last state. 
In the Sigma model, the observer's mind, as in the single-mind or many-minds theory, is 
not a quantum mechanical system; it is never in superposition. This is what is meant by 
saying that it is non-physical. The time evolution of observer's mind in the Sigma 
interpretation is, just as in the many-minds or single mind theory, probabilistic. Furthermore, 
although the evolution of individual stages or renewals is probabilistic, the evolution of the 
set of stages associated with a flowing quantum object is deterministic, since the evolution of 
the measurement process is deterministic and we can read off from the final state the density 
of the stages in various states. 
Evolution of flowing systems, in the Sigma interpretation, is both causal and stochastic. 
From the observer's point of view, it is stochastic, but the probabilistic feature is not inherent 
in nature, rather it originates from specific statistical distribution of renewal of stages of the 
flowing system. This indeterminism is not necessarily a sign of intrinsic chances in nature. 
Rather it means objects involve continuous renewal with a specific distribution. Of course, 
we should pursue a plausible account for this distribution. This is close to the Bohm's 
interpretation. We have an implicit order, which is the source of explicit order. The observer, 
who does not see all dimensions, only sees a determinate outcome and, at this level, he could 
describe all what he sees but could not give an intelligible account for it.  
The interpretation which takes the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics as the 
result of our ignorance, the so called ignorance interpretation, is not consistent with the real 
superposition states and empirical outcome of quantum mechanics (Auletta 2000: 107-115). 
In the SI, likewise, we could not adhere to the ignorant interpretation of probabilities, since 
                                                        
1
 In Sigma interpretation, contrary to Everett's theory, the whole system does not exist at a moment. It has 
temporal parts and its whole reality can be found at the whole lifetime of system. 
2
 This is similar to the single-mind analogue of the evolution of position in Bell's Everett theory. See (Bell 
1987:133) and (Barrett 1999:187) 
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that specific distribution is part and parcel of the flowing system. Despite this fact, pursuing 
hidden variables for individual events is not only warranted, but also recommanded. Bohm, in 
his later works, took the stochastic feature irreducible not in the sense that there is no 
causality. There could be hidden variables at deeper levels.1 He maintained that “… the 
chaotic or stochastic character may be contingent and determined by conditions in domains 
not covered by the particular theory in question. For example, random variations in the 
trajectory of a Brownian particle may be partially or even totally determined by atomic 
motions at a deeper level. So ultimately our overall world view is neither absolutely 
deterministic, nor absolutely indeterministic. Rather it implies that these two extremes are 
abstractions, which constitute different views or aspects of the overall set of appearances. 
Which view is appropriate in a given case will depend both on the unknown totality and on 
our particular mode of contact with it (e.g. the kinds of experiments we are able to do).” 
(Bohm & Hiley 1993: 324; italics are mine). 
So, we can and should still raise the question why such a distribution governs these 
renewals. We need an independent justification, other than adequacy of quantum mechanics, 
to account for this distribution, and this is not a problem specific to the SI alone; Bohm’s and 
Everrett's model also have such a postulate and should give a plausible account for it. 
6. Problem of Effect 
Consider an electron with positive x-spin enters a device with z-spin measuring device. The 
outgoing electron has a z-up spin or z-down spin. Repeatability condition requires if the first 
measurement outcome is up, then the result of the second measurement, which is immediately 
done, also certainly and definitely ought to be up. This is known as the problem of effect. 
These considerations make “plausible” (but of course are not intended to ‘prove’) one of 
the postulates of standard quantum mechanics, which tells us how the state vector is affected 
by a measurement: A measurement of an observable generally causes a drastic, 
uncontrollable alteration in the state vector of the system; specifically, regardless of the form 
of the state vector just before the measurement, immediately after the measurement it will 
coincide with the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue obtained in the measurement.  
Ballentine criticized Dirac (1958, 36) for taking such a condition seriously. He 
maintained that expecting the second measurement of the same observable, immediately after 
the first measurement, to yield the same result of the first measurement  
“… is true at most for the very special class of measurements that do not change the 
quantity being measured. A statement of such a limited applicability is hardly suitable to 
play any fundamental role in foundations of quantum theory. In fact this argument is 
based on the implicit (and incorrect) assumption that measurement is equivalent to state 
preparation, … . For example, a Polaroid filter placed in the path of a photon beam 
constitute a state preparation with respect to the polarization of any transmitted photons. 
A second Polaroid at the same angle has no further effect. But neither of these processes 
constitutes a measurement. To measure the polarization of a photon one must also detect 
                                                        
1
 This is similar to Ballentine's statistical interpretation. See (Ballentine 1970:380), (Auletta 2000:106). 
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whether or not the photon was transmitted through the Polaroid filter. Since the detector 
will absorb the photon, no second measurement is possible.” (Ballentine 1970:369). 
This argument, however, seems to be inconclusive. Consider an x-spin measurement on 
a y-spin up electron. In any theory, this measurement will change the quantity being 
measured: before the measurement, in the standard interpretation, the electron does not have 
an x-spin. But immediately repeating the measurement will certainly give the same result. 
The absorption of the particle in certain measurement techniques is incidental, and one could 
imagine ways of carrying out the measurement that does not do this. The predictions of the 
theory for the measurement outcome would not be changed. There are classes of 
measurements, associated with projection operators, for which repeating the measurement 
immediately will certainly give the same result. There will be correlations between 
successive results, which is another way to have the problem of effect. So, as Maudlin said:  
“The result of a measurement therefore has predictive power for the future: after the first 
measurement is completed we are in a position to know more about the outcome of the 
second than we could before the first measurement was made. Any theory which seeks to 
replicate the empirical content of the traditional theory should have this feature.” 
(1995:13).  
Similarly, Bell, in a critical assessment of Everett theory, pointed out that Everett's 
model, like Bohm's, should suggest a dynamics to preserve the reliability and to yield the 
previous result in repeating measurements (Bell 1964:133, 135-6), (Barrett 1999:80, 124-
6,185). 
But what about the Sigma model?  What does the observer actually measure? According 
to the Sigma model, the probability of the actual outcome ending up associated with a 
particular term in the quantum-mechanical state is completely determined by the current 
quantum-mechanical state and is independent of past outcomes. It is given by the square of 
the coefficients of the terms when the wave function is written in the related basis. 
The system, in this interpretation, is in perpetual renewal. These renewals could happen 
in a way completely similar to the previous one, and from the empirical observation and 
observer's standpoint, it is like saying that the same value has been obtained. This situation, 
however, cannot be sufficient to solve the problem of effect. It would be typically possible 
that the observer's immediate measurement, in fact, would lead to wildly different outcomes. 
This situation is similar to the Bell’s Everrett(?) theory. As Bell put it:  
in our interpretation of the Everett theory there is no association of the particular present 
with any particular past. And the essential claim is that this does not matter at all. For we 
have no access to the past. We have only our 'memories' and 'records'. But these memories 
and records are in fact present phenomena The theory should account for the present 
correlations between these present phenomena. And in this respect we have seen it to 
agree with ordinary quantum mechanics, in so far as the latter is unambiguous. (Bell 1987: 
135-6) 
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Bell objected that “if such a theory were taken seriously it would hardly be possible to 
take anything else seriously” (1987: 136; see also 1987: 98). The same is true for the SI. 
While, generally and typically, it is in agreement with the statistics of standard theory, there 
is no guarantee that there would be a correlation between the present subjective result and 
later or former mental result.1 Accordingly, Sigma theory, Just as Everett-like theories, needs 
an explicit rule to connect states at different times (Barrett 1999:197-198), and without such 
an explicit auxiliary dynamics the Sigma theory seems to be incomplete. This auxiliary 
dynamics, which can be obtained as Bohm’s approach for particle path equation, is to 
describe how the determinate local stages (temporal parts of the quantum object) evolve, 
while the universal wave function is evolving in its usual linear way. 2  
 
7. Conclusion 
Every rational theory, whether scientific or philosophical, is rational in so far as it tries to 
solve certain problems.3 In this line of thought, we attempted to show that the Sigma 
interpretation, as a theoretical proposal for the measurement problem, is as reasonable and 
rational as rival theories to give an account of the measurement problem, by assessing its 
ability and capacity to solve the three measurement problems, i.e. the problem of outcome, 
problem of statistics and problem of effects.  
The SI is an attempt to show, if we want to be realist about quantum theory, if we want 
to accept the entities and states of the theory as real, we need to suggest new conceptual 
schemes, but neither in an isolated way nor in an ad-hoc manner. It suggests, by taking 
superposition state as real, a new conceptual framework; or in Bohm's word, a “new order” 
for our universe (Bohm 1980:175). In spite of some similarities, SI, by taking four-
dimensionalism metaphysics, is sufficiently differentiated from other interpretations. 
Sigma, like Everett-like and Bohm’s model, has an advantage over the standard 
interpretation.  All of them, unlike standard interpretation, are completely explicit about what 
really exists and how they evolve. There is no shifty division between the macro and micro 
worlds. There are also some more advantages: First, unlike the bare theory4, Sigma is in 
accord with our very deep conviction that mental states never superpose. Nonetheless, it 
remains true to Everett's fundamental idea that the time evolution of the entire universe and 
every physical system is given by the linear dynamics: There is no need to postulate collapses 
or splits or any other non-quantum mechanical physical phenomena. The reason that 
‘physical’ is emphasized here, is that Sigma, like many-minds theory, supposes the existence 
                                                        
1
 It seems that all subjective interpretations, even von Neumann's own interpretation, which takes collapse as a 
subjective process, involves such a difficulty. 
2
 Stage dynamics, in the Sigma, is on a par with mental states in the many-minds interpretation, as Albert said 
“What's been said so far … doesn't amount to a completely general set of laws of the evolution of mental 
states; but laws like that can be cooked up, and they can be cooked up in such a way as to guarantee that 
everything I've said about them so far will be true.”(1992:129) 
3
 This doctrine has been mainly developed by Popper. See for example, Popper (1958). 
4
 See Barrett (1999:194) 
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of a nonphysical entity, namely the observer's mind, whose states are not determined by the 
global quantum-mechanical state of the flowing object, and it makes possible the self-
consciousness of the observer to his trans-temporal identity. Sigma theory also provides a 
particularly natural way to make sense of the claim that, at the end of a typical measurement, 
while in one sense there is only one physical observer and one physical system, in another 
sense there are many potentialities with mutually incompatible experiences. But, contrary to 
many-minds theory, there is no need, in the SI, to consider continuous infinite minds for the 
observer, and to encounter difficulties in interpreting what it means to have many minds and 
how it is possible to have these minds, while all belongs to an individual observer, without 
any connection between them. There is no more than one mind in the SI, but this mind 
encounters continuous and infinite renewals of the system. Moreover, because of the reality 
and genuine nature of superposition states, Sigma model, has no problem concerning 
personal identity. 
Everett gives no explanation for the total lack of influence of one branch on another. He, it 
seems, takes it for granted to explain why one would not feel the branching process. The 
same is true for unobservability of the splitting of universe in many-worlds theory. In the 
Sigma theory, however, there is an account for it: none of the two temporal parts of a flowing 
object (a four-dimensional object), as a flowing continuum, like time, exists together. 
Moreover, taking this model seriously, leads us to the conclusion that quantum theory shows 
yet another limitation of our perceptual experience, i.e. our inability to perceive unsharp 
reality.1 
Despite these advantages, the four-dimensionalism proposed in the SI, may still provoke 
“incredulous stares”! We cannot consider the type of relation of mental state to physical state 
that Sigma theory provides as supervenience in a usual sense.2 If we accept mental 
supervenience, we might want the mental state to supervene on physical state. But based on 
the Sigma theory, the observer is associated with an infinite set of stages that most likely are 
associated with wildly contradictory beliefs and whose mental states the observer cannot 
know at a single moment. Although, the fact that the observer is associated with a continuous 
infinity of stages is at least counter-intuitive, this theory is not so counter-intuitive as many-
minds which associates each observer with an infinity of minds. But, though we have 
mentioned some advantages and positive arguments in favor of SI, there is no advantage 
claim at this stage. The claim of the paper, as mentioned in the abstract, is modest: SI is as 
rationally plausible as its rivals and deserves to be criticized.  
                                                        
1
 It is a virtue for a scientific or philosophical theory to specify, in some ways, the limitations of our knowledge. 
Relativity shows our limitations in accessing information outside of the light cone. Godel's theorem specifies 
limitations of certain axiomatic systems. Kant's theory of knowledge attempted to show limitations of 
reasonable knowledge. All of these theories, regardless of their plausibility, specify, in some ways, limitations 
of our knowledge. 
2
 The Sigma interpretation is not unique concerning supervenience. We encounter similar situation in von 
Neumann's interpretation (Becker 2004:127), and Bohm's theory (Pylkkanen 2007:192). It is also worth 
mentioning that mind-body dualism is not specific to SI. The many-minds and von Neumann Interpretation have 
the same presupposition of dualism. Moreover, since a clear account of mind/body interaction concerns the 
general mind/body problem, so this is not a problem that this paper aims to tackle with. 
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Finally, as Sklar (1974:2) and Balashov (1999) put it, there is an interdepence between 
science and philosophy. It is not simply that one cannot do good philosophy without relying 
upon the results of scientific theorizing. Although Science constantly forces us to revise and 
tame our commonsense and intuition, the acceptance or rejection of particular scientific 
theories depends as much upon the adoption of philosophical presuppositions as it does upon 
the evidence of observation and experimentation. The measurement problem is sometimes 
portrayed as merely philosophical, or of no interest to physics proper. This, as Maudlin 
(1995) said, is quite untrue. Each model carries with itself an obligation, which demands the 
postulation of new physics. 
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